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ABSTRACT 
To help meet the nation’s energy needs, recycling of partially 
used nuclear fuel is required to close the nuclear fuel cycle, but 
implementing this step will require considerable investment. This 
report evaluates financing scenarios for integrating recycling 
facilities into the nuclear fuel cycle. A range of options from fully 
government owned to fully private owned were evaluated using DPL 
(Decision Programming Language 6.0), which can systematically 
optimize outcomes based on user-defined criteria (e.g., lowest life-
cycle cost, lowest unit cost). 
This evaluation concludes that the lowest unit costs and lifetime 
costs are found for a fully government-owned financing strategy, due 
to government forgiveness of debt as sunk costs. However, this does 
not mean that the facilities should necessarily be constructed and 
operated by the government. The costs for hybrid combinations of 
public and private (commercial) financed options can compete under 
some circumstances with the costs of the government option. This 
analysis shows that commercial operations have potential to be 
economical, but there is presently no incentive for private industry 
involvement. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) currently 
establishes government ownership of partially used commercial 
nuclear fuel. In addition, the recently announced Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) suggests fuels from several countries 
will be recycled in the United States as part of an international 
governmental agreement; this also assumes government ownership. 
Overwhelmingly, uncertainty in annual facility capacity led to 
the greatest variations in unit costs necessary for recovery of 
operating and capital expenditures; the ability to determine annual 
capacity will be a driving factor in setting unit costs. For private 
ventures, the costs of capital, especially equity interest rates, 
dominate the balance sheet; and the annual operating costs, 
forgiveness of debt, and overnight costs dominate the costs computed 
for the government case. The uncertainty in operations, leading to 
lower than optimal processing rates (or annual plant throughput), is 
the most detrimental issue to achieving low unit costs. Conversely, 
lowering debt interest rates and the required return on investments 
can reduce costs for private industry.  
INTRODUCTION 
With the current heightened concern for air pollutants and 
natural resources conservation, a new focus has been established on 
searching for advanced future energy options. One option under 
consideration is the resurgence of nuclear power with a new, closed 
fuel cycle. Research in this area is being conducted within the 
framework of the Department of Energy’s advanced fuel cycle 
initiative (AFCI). “A mission of the AFCI program is to develop 
technologies that concurrently will meet the need for an economic 
and sustained nuclear option while satisfying requirements for a 
controlled, proliferation-resistant nuclear material management 
system” [1]. 
Initial work on the economics of the private sector versus 
regulated nuclear fuel cycle facilities was completed by Braun in 
2005 and was reported in the 2005 Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis, 
Appendix D [2]. Building on this work, a dynamic model was created 
using Decision Programming Language (DPL) Version 6.0 
Professional. Scenarios were run to determine which factors were 
most influential in determining benefits and costs, and then evaluated 
to develop a realistic range of values. With this range, both discrete 
value and Monte Carlo simulations were run, and the scenarios 
evaluated. This report discusses the merits of various scenarios and 
attempts to understand the cost implications from facility ownership 
options: government, private, and combinations of 
government/private. 
BACKGROUND 
When a recycle facility is constructed to support a future fuel 
cycle, the facility will represent a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant. There 
is little directly applicable research on the ownership options for such 
a facility. Initial work performed by the National Research Council 
evaluated recycling facility ownership options for a private company, 
a utility consortium, and the government [3]. The National Research 
Council determined that “A pure, private venture to design, build, 
own, and operate such a complex, without government financial 
guarantees, appears unrealistic.” Further, they conclude, “At a 
minimum, it would appear that some new type of government 
risk/cost sharing, far more extensive than on past projects/programs,  
2would be necessary to attract utility participation.” Similarly, Bunn 
argued before Congress, “Since facilities required for reprocessing 
and transmutation would not be economically attractive for private 
industry to build, the U.S. government would either have to build and 
operate these facilities itself, give private industry large subsidies to 
do so, or impose onerous regulations requiring private industry to do 
so with its own funds” [4]. 
A comparative analysis of a generic fuel cycle facility was 
conducted by Braun [2] for the AFCI Economic Benefits activity, 
analyzing the unit costs for recycling under various ownership 
options with an ultimate conclusion that government ownership led to 
lowest costs, especially if the government were willing to forgive 
debt. Braun also explored qualitative differences in financing options, 
such as the national social benefit of such a facility and government 
legal obligations to the utilities as related to partially used fuel 
disposition. In addition, there has been some comparative economic 
analysis done on public and private facilities in the past; however, 
most of these are not wholly representative in this case, as the bulk of 
these analyses are based on the electric generating industry power 
plants and carry assumptions not applicable here. There is historical 
evidence of private industry having lower operating costs compared 
to similar government facilities [5]. Further, Shleifer [6] finds that 
private ownership can lead to direct incentives for innovation not 
present in contractual arrangements typical of government facilities. 
Blank [7] analyzed the differences between government ownership 
and regulation, “If quality is readily observable, the government can 
regulate private providers to assure [sic] standards are met. But when 
standards are difficult to observe or when the recipient is not the 
agent who makes decisions, government ownership may be 
preferable.” Assumptions for differences in the operation of regulated 
and unregulated facilities are based on previous studies; Taggert [8] 
showed that regulation in utilities led to less risky behavior with 
firms having greater access to debt financing.  
None of these studies addressed the sort of complexity present 
when dealing with controlled material (nuclear fuel) or firms that do 
not have to compete for continued contracts. In the case of recycling 
nuclear fuel, only one customer (the government) will control all the 
input material to the facility and most of the output products; this one 
customer relationship was also not explored in the literature. 
APPROACH
This analysis is designed to meet the needs of the AFCI 
program. To that end, we have considered the required capacities and 
processes stated in the AFCI Report to Congress [1]. The AFCI 
program is considering advancements to the established PUREX 
process, such as UREX+ and pyroprocessing as recycling technology 
options. The specific designs and methods for separation in a future 
fuel recycle facility have not yet been determined. There are limited 
cost data available on new recycle facility costs that would be 
applicable to a United States facility construction application. The 
AFCI program has compiled historical reports and studies on 
recycling and has determined that there are very large cost 
uncertainty ranges for these facilities. 
The current plan does not anticipate large numbers of recycle 
facilities being built, so the relative advantages coming from next-of-
a-kind or eventually (Nth-of-a-kind or NOAK) facilities are ignored, 
and the financing options are only considered for the FOAK facility. 
Subsequent facilities, if built, will likely have similar financing 
considerations as the first. 
This model follows the conclusions drawn from previous 
studies. For comparison, this model could easily be extended to 
include the modeling of other related facilities, such as those intended 
for fuel fabrication or combined (integrated) recycling and 
refabrication. The ownership structure for facilities in mature 
industries is not in doubt, but similar analyses may be necessary for 
new processes that accompany or complement the intention to 
recycle partially used nuclear fuel. 
The model was set up for comparing: (a) a totally government-
constructed-and-operated facility, (b) a government-constructed 
facility sold to a private sector corporation with a portion of initial 
investment forgiven, (c) a private-sector regulated facility, and (d) a 
private-sector unregulated facility. This type of economic model 
could be extended and easily modified to accommodate all facilities 
to be considered (e.g., separations, fabrication, and storage).  
Assumptions 
The major baseline financial assumptions underlying this 
analysis are provided in Tables 1 and 2. These assumptions are 
consistent with existing technology reported in the open literature, 
and the initial basis used in AFCI studies on the economics of the 
private sector versus regulated nuclear fuel cycle facilities [2]. All the 
computations carried out here relate to a hypothetical facility and do 
not represent any specific plant design or cost data. 
Considerations 
Originally, return on investment (ROI) in the model was a 
calculated variable from other inputs, but this setup did not allow 
direct comparison of government and private facilities. From these 
financial assumptions, the ROI to private investors becomes fixed in 
the model at the required ROI (as shown in Table 2). This may not be 
the real-world scenario, as investors may demand a higher ROI (or 
receive a lower one) than suggested here, depending on the degree of 
perceived risk and risk mitigation measures contemplated. Also, 
private companies may choose to allocate capital expenses differently 
among debt and equity portions. There are some tax advantages to 
maximizing debt; however, there has not been the tendency of 
corporations to simply maximize debt, because there are other 
advantages to having equity financing [9].  
To meet the needs of a new generation of nuclear power plants, 
it is expected that the first commercial-scale recycling facility would 
be commercialized by the year 2025, with a capacity of 2,500 to 
3,000 MT/yr and a design life of 40 years [1]. Further, AFCI is also 
considering 3,000-MT/yr facilities with a lifetime of 60 years. These 
possibilities are not modeled here as they suggest significant 
deviations from the currently available data on other existing recycle 
facilities and estimates of future scenarios. The existing technology 
(PUREX) is used at both La Hague (two plants with 800-MT/yr 
capacity each) and THORP (1,200 MT/yr). This analysis uses the 
800 MT/yr as a baseline capacity for comparison. We do investigate 
the implications from increasing this capacity to those under 
consideration by the AFCI program in one scenario.  
TABLE 1. ANALYSIS MAJOR BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 
Baseline values used in all four 
cases 
Total capital charges (TCIC) $8.0 billion 
Annual operating costs (O&M) $396 million/year 
Annual capacity 800,000 kgHM/year 
Lifetime 30 years 
3TABLE 2. FINANCIAL ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE MODEL 
Government Constructed 
& Operated 
Government Constructed 
& Sell Private Regulated Private Unregulated Private 
Debt portion (%) 100.0 40 50 30 
Debt interest rate (%/yr) 4.0  4.8 4.8 9.0 
Equity portion (%) 0 60 50 70 
Required return on investment (%/yr) N/A 10.5 8.5 16.0 
Insurance (%/yr) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Federal taxes (%/yr) N/A 33.0 33.0 33.0 
State and local taxes (%/yr) (average) N/A 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Forgiveness of Plant Investment (%) 100% 62.5%a  N/A N/A 
a. Of the debt, 62.5% is considered forgiven by the government. The private owner then distributes capital portions over only the 37.5% of the initial capital investment 
made by the government.  This figure is simply an assumption used for comparison; the actual forgiveness percentage will be chosen by legislation. 
While we are considering optimizing a fuel recycle facility, 
definitive studies have not been done showing that this is the only 
path forward. We have not modeled other used fuel treatment 
options. The reader should be mindful that recycling costs need to be 
compared against other fuel processing and technology costs, and 
with competing energy source costs when determining energy 
strategies. Consideration should also be made of the fact that the 
current legal framework establishes government ownership of used 
nuclear fuel [11]. We should also consider the fact that costs will be 
recovered from citizens of some classification, ratepayers for private 
financing and taxpayers for government financing. Depending on the 
political environment, support may be greater for a public/private 
partnership like the government-to-private partnership case modeled 
here, since the costs are distributed among taxpayers and ratepayers. 
SETTING UP THE MODEL 
The model (Figure 1) was created using spreadsheets and 
Decision Programming Language DPL 6.0 with a strategy table to 
allow for adjustment of some values to support the four modeled 
cases. This model is quite simple to allow for wide applicability and 
generalization. 
The model shows the various financing and assumed inputs as 
well as calculations for our analysis. The large yellow rectangle is the 
“strategy table” where our decisions (smaller rectangles) are selected 
based on choices made to model the case; the decisions are selected 
to match our assumptions in Table 2. 
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FIG. 1. DPL 6.0 MODEL OF FINANCING STRATEGIES 
The financing calculations are the most important aspect of our 
model. The model uses our input assumption values to calculate a 
Fixed Charge Rate (FCR) through the following calculations. 
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4TABLE 3. CALCULATED FCR AND NOMINAL UNIT COSTS 
Government Constructed  
& Operated 
Government Constructed 
& Sell Private Regulated Private Unregulated Private 
FCR (for case) 0.51186 0.13196 0.106399 0.211545 
Resulting Unit Cost ($/kgHM) 495 990 1559 2610 
The Annual Capital Charges are the sum of annual capital costs 
incurred by the government or private sector, depending on the case. 
Annual charges for each are simply the Overnight Costs multiplied 
by the calculated FCR. The calculated FCR and unit costs with 
nominal input values are shown in Table 3. 
The unit cost is determined by ensuring that all annual costs are 
met with the proceeds from the annual throughput. Further research 
will have to investigate what the actual asking cost will have to be to 
ensure that enough is made off the actual throughput to cover costs 
incurred.  
cityAnnualCapa
MCostsAnnualOtalCostsAnnualCapi
UnitCost
&
  (2) 
In DPL, the sensitivity of each variable is determined by 
creating a tornado diagram. The variables for the baseline 
government constructed and operated option were run over a range of 
potential values (+/- 50% of nominal value except where the range is 
0 to 1) as noted on the value tornado diagram in Figure 2. On the 
diagram, each bar shows the end values as “end of range/expected 
unit cost with this value.” Only those variables that had a significant 
effect on the value of the estimated unit costs were included in this 
analysis. 
The green ovals in Figure 1 are showing values for which 
uncertainty has been assigned. Uncertainty has been added to the 
model by assigning values in the forms of normal curves with a mean 
at the nominal value and a standard deviation of 10%. This results in 
99.73% of possible input values falling into the range of three 
standard deviations on either side of the nominal value. One 
exception to the normal curve is lifetime. The lifetime could vary 
substantially from the 30-year assumption, so the uncertainty in 
lifetime is modeled by a uniform probability from 20 to 50 years. 
Also, the amount of debt incurred by the government, which is 
forgiven, is assumed to be 100%, except in the case where it is 
modeled that the government does not forgive (or sink) debt. 
The way the DPL program runs through the scenarios is 
depicted by the decision tree in Figure 3. The decision tree shows the 
flow through the model to determine the outcomes. The model will 
run through each of the four financing options with 1 million cases; 
each case will go through the decision tree, so we actually run 
4 million cases each time we do an analysis on this model. The case 
will stop at each continuous chance node, where the model will “roll 
the dice” (Monte Carlo simulation) to determine a value for that 
parameter, then the model will continue until the desired value for 
comparison is reached. In this case, the objective function is unit 
costs, which is evaluated and then compared across the financing 
scenarios. 
Baseline Government Construct and Operate
Expected Value:  Annual Capacity 800,000 kgHM/year, Overnight Costs $8000M, Gov Forgives 0%, Annual O&M Costs $396M, Lifetime 30years
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RESULTS
With this setup, the model was run to see the range of unit costs 
and the relationship between the financing strategies. For 
clarification, these simulations are all run under the assumptions 
documented in the previous section, except where explicitly noted. 
From Figure 4, we can see that there is a large distribution of costs 
from the low mean of nearly $500/kgHM to around $2600/kgHM. 
The government ownership option provides the lowest estimated 
unit cost distribution. By decreasing the level of government 
involvement, the options become progressively more expensive. The 
regulated option is more attractive than private ownership, even 
though none of the debt is forgiven. The private (unregulated) option 
is clearly the most expensive option.  
Figure 5 shows a broad and overlapping range of estimated 
lifetime cumulative costs across the options (representing 20 to 
50 years of operation). All costs are considered recovered, as the unit 
costs are determined by the facility costs. The government option 
results in the lowest costs primarily due to the writing-off of the debt 
of $8 billion, and the government-to-private option is the next least 
cost, as 62.5% of the initial investment is forgiven and not recovered 
from the sales of services. 
The results from the nominal scenario lead us to investigate 
various policy scenarios. For each scenario, the simulations will be 
run again to estimate unit and lifetime costs. These scenarios help to 
gain a greater appreciation of the possibilities to determine the best 
financing option. 
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1. What if the government doesn’t forgive or 
write off the plant construction debt? 
The public is more likely to support a project that will minimize 
government-sunk money. Historically, it has been the practice of the 
U.S. Government to write-off its own debt when building facilities 
that are used for the public good. Politically, the term public good
varies in definition by users; so, what is considered a public good for 
some may be a waste to others. For these reasons, we consider cases 
that minimize government-sunk money by repaying the debt over the 
facility’s lifetime.  
In this simulation, only the wholly owned government option is 
changed, to reflect the possibility that the government could choose 
to not forgive the debt. When debt is not forgiven, the government 
ownership cost advantage is significantly diminished over the course 
of the lifetime of the facility, as shown in Figures 6 and 7. In this 
case, the government is assumed to still forgive 62.5% of the debt 
when transferred to the private sector, which results in reduced costs 
to the taxpayers. This change results in the government-to-private 
option becoming slightly less expensive than the wholly owned 
government option. 
2. What if problems cause annual capacity to be 
less than nominal? 
For this question, the scenario runs with the annual capacity at 
30 to 70% (240,000 to 560,000 kgHM/yr) of the nominal design 
capacity of 800,000 kgHM/yr as a uniform distribution of probability. 
The recycling facility may run at lower than the nominal design 
capacity due to being a first-of-a-kind facility. Lowering the annual 
plant capacity leads to higher unit costs, as should be expected 
(Figure 8). The tornado diagram (Figure 2) showed expected increase 
in costs for lower capacity. What might not have been expected is the 
shape of the new probability distribution graphs. The ranges are 
much broader, compared to the nominal values, and there is more 
uncertainty associated with the higher costs in the ranges. An 
interesting result of this analysis is the asymmetric distribution of the 
cost curve when the capacity is reduced. The left side of the 
distribution corresponds to the 70% value (560,000 kgHM/yr) of the 
capacity reduction and the 30% (240,000 kgHM/yr) value results in 
the long distribution tail to the right. The asymmetric cost distribution 
pattern is derived from the ratio of the fixed (capital recovery) costs 
to the variable (production) costs for this case. It is unnecessary to 
include a lifetime cost curve since the costs each year are recovered 
based on capacity; the curve will be identical to the nominal case. 
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3. What if there are significant economies of 
scale and a larger plant is built? 
This is an important question considering that the current fleet of 
reactors produces more than 800 MTHM of used fuel per year and 
the country is considering recycling fuel from other nation’s nuclear 
programs as well. For this case, a 2,500-MTHM facility was 
simulated assuming that it could be built and operated for the same 
costs assumed for our nominal 800-MTHM plant. Note here that 
there is no agreement in the literature as to the scalability of such 
plants [11, 12]. From Figure 9, we can see that increasing capacity 
has an expected outcome related to unit costs, but the increase is less 
important than the decrease as modeled in the previous scenario. The 
tornado diagram (Figure 2) shows that for the base case, the effect of 
a 50% decrease in capacity had a greater effect than a 50% increase. 
Again, the unit costs are based on the capacity to ensure their 
coverage, so the lifetime costs will be the same as in the nominal 
case. 
4. What if guaranteed contracts or government 
incentives are in place leading to lower 
investment risk? 
To run a simulation of lower risk, the debt interest rate and 
required return on investment were lowered for private investing to 
6 and 10%, respectively (values lower than nominal). We assume that 
lowering the risk will bring private ownership closer to the results 
from regulated ownership. Simulating lower risk is consistent with 
many proposed legislation ideas to reduce risks for capital intensive 
energy industry components. Such approach has been written into the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 [13]. At the moment, recycle facilities are 
not considered in the legislation, but it is possible that the incentives 
put into place for energy producing facilities in the EPACT 2005 
might in future legislation be applied to other types of facilities that 
support the U.S. energy infrastructure. 
The reduced risk to the private sector scenario, shown in 
Figure 10, leads to the private option having improved certainty and 
lower unit costs. This is demonstrated by the narrower cost 
distributions. The government-to-private option also has slight 
improvements in certainty and costs because of the reduction of 0.5% 
of the ROI for the equity financing received. 
The lifetime cost result in Figure 11 is similar to the unit cost 
result in Figure 10, with the unregulated case shifting noticeably to 
lower values and the government-to-private cost distributions moving 
slightly to the left (decreasing costs). The differences in their shift are 
due to the original assumptions which already benefited the 
government-to-private option with a debt interest rate of 4.8% and 
equity ROI of 10.5%. Therefore, the government-to-private scenario 
only gains 0.5% ROI rate reduction on the equity portion of its 32.5% 
of investment to be recovered, which results in a very small change in 
the resulting cost. However, the private-unregulated ownership 
option benefits by the reduction of the debt interest rate from 9 to 6% 
and equity ROI rate from 16 to 10%. 
5. How does a government subsidy compare 
with the reduced risk scenario? 
Economists often argue the merits of subsidies versus taxes. In 
this scenario, we are looking for the unit cost results assuming a 
significant ($2 billion) subsidy was applied to new recycle plant 
construction. This effectively lowers the overnight costs from $8 
billion to $6 billion for the private cases. Figures 12 and 13 show that 
the unregulated case appears to benefit more from the subsidy while 
the regulated case appears to benefit less than it did from reduced risk 
(lower interest rates) as seen in comparison with Figures 10 and 11; 
the government-to-private case shows less certainty in the subsidy 
scenario than in the reduced risk scenario. 
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CONCLUSION 
The most consistent result from our studies of the costs of fuel 
recycle facilities is that government ownership generally leads to 
lowest costs. However, this does not mean that the facilities should 
necessarily be constructed and operated by the government. Through 
this analysis we found that the costs of the government–to-private 
and the private (regulated) ownership options were not greatly 
different than the fully government owned option. This analysis 
indicates that commercial operations have potential to be economical, 
but there is presently no incentive for private industry involvement, 
since the current legal framework establishes government ownership 
of partially used fuel [10].  
We have come to similar conclusions regarding the significance 
of cost variables as does the AFCI 2005 study prepared by 
Shropshire. In the government ownership option; annual O&M costs, 
forgiveness of debt, and overnight costs are the most significant cost 
contributors. In the regulated and private ownership cases, initial 
capital costs will be most significant. Further, we have established 
that uncertainty in variables has a greater effect on the private 
ownership option than the others. 
Uncertainty in operation, leading to lower annual capacity, is the 
most detrimental scenario economically. Determining the facilities 
throughput will be a driving factor in setting unit costs. There is a 
significant penalty for operating at less than capacity, as shown by 
the 30 to 70% nominal annual capacity simulation. With appreciable 
economies for full-capacity facility operation, the facility should be 
designed for maximum throughput and availability to support the 
needs of the nuclear power plant fleet. If high annual plant capacities 
(approaching 3,000 MT/yr) are achievable within the same range of 
capital and operation cost parameters as modeled, then unit costs less 
than $500/kgHM could be obtained. These capacities could result 
from significant economies of scale (specifically capital cost versus 
capacity), arising from the construction design and facility operations 
designed for optimal economic throughput. The construction of 
parallel recycle lines all feeding from a centralized facility might 
allow such economies of scale to be achieved.  
Mitigating risks, thereby lowering debt interest rates and 
required return on investments, led to the most promising result for 
private-unregulated industry initiative. A subsidy showed benefits to 
the private-regulated industry ownership/operations model. Most of 
the contributors to costs for the private ownership ventures are found 
in the interest on debt and equity for the initial capital investment. 
Any mechanism causing the capital investment and the related 
returns rates to decrease will lead to a more attractive situation for 
private ownership. 
Further research should investigate the year by year costs of 
changing conditions on the financial parameters. Significant work 
still must be done on the scalability of these facilities and the 
comparison of constructing multiple facilities of varying sizes. 
Political research must also be undertaken to determine the 
conditions under which legislation could be passed to encourage 
private investment if that is desired. 
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